

VU Filosofijos istorijos ir logikos katedra

kartu su

Analitinės filosofijos seminaru

kviečia į



Vidurio Europos universiteto (CEU) profesoriaus

Hanoch Ben Yami

paskaitą

“Why Rigidity?”

Paskaita anglų kalba

Kada:

2010 m. lapkričio 8 d. 17.00 val.

Kur:

VU Filosofijos fakultete, 303 aud.

Apie pranešėją

Hanoch Ben Yami yra Vidurio Europos universiteto (Vengrija) filosofijos profesorius. Jis tyrinėja kalbos filosofijos, logikos ir fizikos filosofijos problemas. Jis yra knygos “Logic & Natural Language: On Plural Reference and its Semantic and Logical Significance” (2004) bei kelių dešimčių mokslinių straipsnių autorius.

Santrauka:

In *Naming and Necessity* Saul Kripke argues 'intuitively' for the claim that proper names are rigid. Unlike him, I attempt to derive rigidity, or something close to it, from other facts about our use of referring expressions and of language more generally, relying on a principle first formulated by Buridan. I dub the related derived principle, the independence of reference. I then discuss a difficulty in accepted formulations of the rigidity claim, stemming from the fact that the same name can be used to name different particulars. This difficulty might force us to adopt a weaker or revised form of the rigidity claim, which is very close to the principle of the independence of reference; a result that in its turn suggests that it might be best to consider the related principle as saving whatever can be saved of the rigidity claim. Additional facts concerning the behaviour of referring expressions in modal contexts, unexplained by the rigidity claim but derivable from the principle of the independence of reference, are discussed as well, the discussion supporting the same conclusion. These considerations also lead to a discussion of rigid versus alleged non-rigid uses of definite descriptions, its conclusion being in disagreement with Kripke's position.